Thursday, 28 January 2016

Characterization of an objective in a public policy: the WTO law approach

Characterization of an objective in a public policy: the WTO law approach
by Yahir ACOSTA
Luis Yahir Acosta Pérez

This post will demonstrate that the legal characterization of a legitimate objective is of the utmost importance. It will begin exploring the meaning and scope of the legitimate objectives contained in TBT Agreement and GATT, respectively. Jurisprudence shows that the nature and characteristics of the legitimate objectives on the TBT Agreement can be relevant for interpreting GATT article XX subparagraphs, and vice versa. But, how complex is the operation for determining the legitimate objective?
McGrady holds that the characterization of a regulatory goal or legitimate objective is generally taken at face value by Panels and the AB.[1] The recent trilogy jurisprudence on the TBT Agreement[2] (US – Clove Cigarettes,[3] US – Tuna[4] and US – COOL[5]) would seem to confirm this statement.[6] However, EC – Seals appears to run against this vector. In this case, much emphasis was put on the issue of the Seal Welfare as a legitimate objective. A closer look at this case makes evident that the Panel and AB made a deep analysis of the legitimate objective and interests at issue, but only to determine the relationship between them. This is a novel issue in WTO jurisprudence[7] and anticipates that future cases involving multiple objectives and interests that are mutually exclusive will demand a lot of interpretative energy from panels and the AB.
Sungjoon Cho proposes a theoretical approach to the WTO system which will be helpful for understanding the importance of the legal characterization of the objective in the GATT and TBT Agreement. Cho’s main idea regarding the multilateral trading system or what he calls the Trade Constitution 2.0 is that: “[a]s future trade disputes concern more about non-tariff barriers of all sorts, the WTO tribunal will embrace the Trade Constitution 2.0 more often. More interpretive energy will be spent on issue [sic] of “how” a measure was applied, rather than “what” the measure was all about.”[8] As will be explained, this is in line with the recent GATT and TBT jurisprudence, including the Seal case. Following this idea, the legal characterization of the objective of a measure determines the “what” whereas the way the measure is applied defines the “how”.
The right to regulate is a deference to all WTO Members that allows them to rule, a priori, on any necessary legitimate objective. In EC – Seals, a case about an import ban on seal products placed by the European Union with the aim of protecting seal welfare, the AB recently admitted for the first time that article XX of the GATT reflects the right to regulate of all WTO Members. The AB also recalled that this right is also present in the TBT Agreement (paras. 5.124-25). Finally, the AB stressed that deference must be given to this right.
Having in mind the power of the “right to regulate”, it would seem that Cho’s idea is on the right path. Neither Panels nor the AB will spend much energy determining the legal characterization of the objective of a measure. As will be explained, this might be true for most cases with a single objective, but definitely not for all cases with multiple policy objectives at stake, as the Seals case evidenced.
In any case, Cho’s words must not be confused with the trivialization of the legal determination of an objective in a public policy. This is a delicate task which, in its turn, plays a fundamental role in the analysis of the “how”. It is so, because the objective works as a benchmark.[9] For instance, in the context of the TBT Agreement it “is the logical starting point in the analysis under Article 2.2 […], because it serves as the reference point for the purpose of analysing whether a measure is ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary’ to achieve its objective”.[10] In other words, a legitimate objective is a condition sine qua non to justify discrimination.
For this reason, the legal characterization of the objective of a measure forms an essential part of the analysis to be conducted under article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, which provides for two conditions “that technical regulations must comply with in order not to constitute unnecessary obstacles to international trade”.[11] This two-step analysis[12] consists of the following requirements:
–   “Technical regulations must pursue a legitimate objective; and
–   They must not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil that legitimate objective, taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create.”[13] (emphasis added)

This importance is similar in the GATT. As will be explained in Part IV, the necessity test is located in article XX and as such, the legitimate objective will play a pivotal role in this analysis, both in the subparagraph and the Chapeau stage, as was evidenced in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres[14] and EC – Seals.
In the previous paragraphs, the importance of the objective has been highlighted in both the “what” and the “how” dimensions. It is also important to mention that the characterization of an objective is a matter of law, and as such, it is subject to appellate review. In the past, this approach was criticized,[15] but treating objectives as a fact would be tantamount to set in stone a Panel’s characterization of the legitimate objective. Evidently, this would mean subtracting interpretative powers from the AB, which can only review matters of law but no factual matters found by the panels. In view of the above, it is concluded that the characterization of an objective is a legal question of the utmost importance. For this reason, the unequivocal identification of the objective is required to both panels and AB, as well as for WTO Members.[16]

1.1  How do WTO Courts can find an objective, and whether it is legitimate?

In light with this right to regulate, jurisprudence shows that the way a Member addresses their defence regarding its legitimate objectives is a strong argument favoured in most cases by the AB in the context of different WTO Agreements.[17] However, according to the AB it is not a definitive one. The legal operation performed by WTO Courts[18] is first, to determine the nature and content of the objective, and subsequently to examine the legitimacy of that particular objective.[19]
Regarding the first step, WTO jurisprudence gives much discretion to Members for setting their own policy goals.[20] However, panels and the AB also enjoy discretion for characterizing the objective pursued by the Member, according to the following standards:
A panel should take into account the Member's articulation of the objective or the objectives it pursues through its measure, but it is not bound by that Member's characterizations of such objective(s). Indeed, the panel must take account of all evidence put before it in this regard, including "the texts of statutes, legislative history, and other evidence regarding the structure and operation" of the measure at issue. A panel's identification of the "objective" of a measure is a matter of legal characterization subject to appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.[21]

For the moment, we can conclude that the evaluation of the legitimacy of a particular objective is a holistic exercise based on objective parameters. This holds true for the TBT, the GATT and other WTO Agreements. However, panels have discretion regarding how much weight will be conferred onto each of these factors. It is noted that WTO jurisprudence shows that the Respondent’s articulation of the objective(s) it pursues through its measure plays one of the most important roles in this assessment. This is element will be considered in Part II of this work when dealing with the hierarchy of multiple objectives.

1.2  To be or not to be a legitimate objective within WTO law

What is the definition of a ‘legitimate objective’? A literal response was given by the AB in US – Tuna when it referred to the dictionary and concluded that a legitimate objective “is an aim or target that is lawful, justifiable, or proper”[22]. It further elaborated that panels must assess first, what is the objective (“what a Member seeks to achieve”), and subsequently, whether it is legitimate or not, according to the parameters mentioned in the first part of this work.[23]
Given the broad phrasing of article XX subparagraphs and TBT article 2 and its context, respectively, and on the other hand the broad discretion for panels and AB for assessing the legitimacy of an objective, it is hard to imagine a sincere public policy objective not passing this test.
Both GATT’s article XX subparagraphs and TBT’s article 2 (plus its preamble) provide a list of legitimate objectives that include protecting human life, the environment, public morals, among other important non-economic values.[24] Thus, both Agreements provide concrete examples of broad concepts that can accommodate legitimate objectives or policy goals. Therefore, these lists illustrate the objectives from the WTO texts angle.
Admittedly, legitimate objectives and legitimate regulatory purposes correspond to different legal concepts in GATT Article XX and other WTO agreements, such as the TBT. However, they represent the same thing. They are an expression of the right to regulate located in Article XX of the GATT and article 2 of the TBT Agreement, respectively (EC – Seals, AB, para 5.124-25). Additionally, as the AB in US – Tuna noted, “we consider that objectives recognized in the provisions of other covered agreements may provide guidance for, or may inform, the analysis of what might be considered to be a legitimate objective under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.” (para. 313). This is an important issue that relates to the next point.

1.3  Are you on the list? Closed/open list of objectives

In EC – Seals, the EU contended that the TBT Agreement has an open list of possible legitimate objectives, which contrasts with the closed list contained in Article XX of the GATT. This fact could trigger interpretative discrepancies, such as allowing Members to protect an objective under the TBT Agreement but not the same objective under the GATT. This imbalance could also push Members to seek relief under the TBT Agreement rather than the GATT.[25]  
As it was mentioned above, the legitimate objectives of the GATT and TBT Agreement are an expression of the right to regulate. The AB concluded that the scope of the right to regulate balance the rights and obligations of the GATT and TBT Agreement, respectively (para. 5.127). Thus, the AB seems to be closing the gap between both Agreements. In the TBT trilogy, the AB constructed an interpretation that made a difference between the legal concepts for justification of a policy between the GATT and TBT Agreement. Considering the AB statements in EC – Seals, this differentiation of the legal concepts starts to look futile.[26] 
Thus, it would seem that all legitimate objectives can be placed equally in the GATT and TBT Agreement. However, there are authors and even countries that are hesitant about this outcome.[27] Yet, their arguments are unconvincing. I believe that a balanced reading of the GATT and TBT Agreement will prevail. As evidenced in this article, this interpretation was confirmed by the AB in EC – Seals (para 5.127). Thus, after EC – Seals it seems that a balanced view should allow Members to fit in article XX as many objectives as in other Agreements. This seems to be in line with the right to regulate recognized by the AB and Sungjoon Cho’s analytical tool, the ‘Trade Constitution 2.0’, and its deference to the “what”.









[1] Benn McGrady, ‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures’, Journal of International Economic Law 12, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 153–73, doi:10.1093/jiel/jgn039, page 158
[2] Some authors have pointed out that this case trilogy is the first one to examine some fundamental issues of the TBT Agreement, and show what kind of technical regulations WTO Members may put in force. See Guzman, Andrew T. and Pauwelyn, Joost H.B., International Trade Law, Second Edition. 2012 (Chapter 19 online version); Yahir Acosta and Bradly J. Condon, Monografía del Acuerdo Sobre Obstáculos Técnicos al Comercio, México, D.F. (CDEI-ITAM, 2014), http://cdei.itam.mx/medios_digitales/archivos/educacion/Monografia%20OTC%20v.5-junio-14.pdf.
[3] United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove Cigarettes) (Appellate Body Report 2012).
[4] United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II (Mexico)) (Appellate Body Report 2012).
[5] United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US – COOL) (Appellate Body Reports 2012).
[6] This trilogy jurisprudence on the TBT Agreement (hereinafter, TBT trilogy) refers only to the three cases mentioned, although it is noted that the Panel in EC – Seals also examined the case under the TBT Agreement scope but its findings on this matter were declared moot by the AB, which preferred to analyze the issue with the GATT. Appellate Body Report, EC – Seals, para 5.70.
[7] In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres the AB did not examine a similar issue because the exceptions to Brazil’s measure were not argued as objectives, and more importantly, were not part of the original policy.
[8] Sungjoon Cho, ‘Trade Constitution 2.0’, International Economic Law and Policy Blog, accessed 10 February 2015, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/03/trade-constitution-20.html.
[9] “the relevant objective is the benchmark against which a panel must assess the degree of contribution made by a challenged technical regulation, as well as by proposed alternative measures.” Appellate Body Report, US – COOL, para. 387.
[10] Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.335.
[11] Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para 7.387.
[12] Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para 7.333.
[13] Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para 7.387. Importantly, the Panel in US – COOL found that the second sentence contains one obligation that can be segmented in different parts. The analysis order of these elements is to be defined on a case-by-case basis. Panel Report, US – COOL, para 7.331.
[14] Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – Retreaded Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, circulated 3 December 2007.
[15] McGrady, ‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures’.
[16] This was the reason why in US-COOL, the AB reprehended the Panel for using a double characterization of the same legitimate objective. “For instance, at times the Panel identified the objective as being "to provide consumer information on origin"; at other times, the Panel referred to the objective as being "to provide as much clear and accurate origin information as possible to consumers". Through these differing formulations of the objective, the Panel introduced a level of uncertainty in its reasoning.” Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para 387 (footnotes omitted).
[17] See for instance, Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para 432; Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para 314; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 140; Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling, para 304. Arguably, the EU in EC – Seals also succeeded in defining its objective, but as we contend below, this was a pyrrhic victory.
[18] Arguably, Panels and the AB are not Courts. Regardless, in this text both concepts are used interchangeably. For more on the nature of WTO Courts see Georges Abi-Saab, "The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation" in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes (eds.), The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[19] “[A] panel must assess what a Member seeks to achieve […] Subsequently, the analysis must turn to the question of whether a particular objective is legitimate”. Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 314.
[20] For instance, the AB has observed “that it is within the authority of a WTO Member to set the public health or environmental objectives it seeks to achieve, as well as the level of protection that it wants to obtain, through the measure or the policy it chooses to adopt.” Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para 140.
[21] Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seals, para. 5.144 (footnotes omitted).
[22] Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 313.
[23] Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 314.
[24] For instance, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement: “Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”
[25] Joost Pauwelyn mentions this open/closed list feature, as well as the differences on the burden of the proof. I agree with him only regarding the latter. Robert Howse and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘WTO Seals: What Is It Really That Makes the AB Think That TBT Doesn’t Apply?’, International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 25 May 2014, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/05/wto-sealswhat-is-it-really-that-makes-the-ab-think-that-tbt-doesnt-apply.html.
[26] This is a point made by Pauwelyn. Ibidem.
[27] Shaffer and Pabian mention the fact that after EC – Seals, the US has manifested “that providing consumer information is not among the list of Article XX exceptions” (emphasis added). However, it is added here that it could be argued that providing consumer information is necessary to avoid or prevent deceptive practices, and as such could be included in Article XX d) “necessary to secure…the prevention of deceptive practices”. I also note that, paradoxically, a similar argument was used by the US in US – Tuna II (Mexico) for protecting one of the objectives of its dolphin safe label (consumer information), but in that case, in the context of article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement (para. 7.437). See Gregory Shaffer and David Pabian, ‘International Decision: European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products’, The American Journal of International Law 109, no. 1 (2015): 154–61, at footnote 15.

Thursday, 17 September 2015

Derecho e izquierdo en imágenes


Acabo de subir esta imagen a la portada de este blog. La imagen hace alusión a los dos hemisferios del cerebro, uno racional (el izquierdo) y otro creativo (el derecho).

Paradójicamente, creo que la idea es meterle mas imágenes a este blog, para ver si así me puedo poner a escribir.




La imagen la encontré buscando "derecho e izquierdo" en google, en este sitio: http://liceopinoverde.edu.co/~site003/node/1050

La teoría argumentativa del razonamiento

Dan Sperber propone una nueva perspectiva sobre cómo conoce y comunica el hombre las ideas. En lugar de una función individual, señala, el razonamiento tiene una función social, específicamente argumentativa. Bajo este esquema, no hay argumento sin sociedad.

Así las cosas, transmitir información supone que el sujeto pasivo tiene una capacidad para discriminar conclusiones irracionales. Si el argumento no contiene información razonable, sus conclusiones serán desechadas.

Convencer al otro (o razonar con el otro) depende de la manera en cómo presentamos la información, es decir, de cómo argumentamos.

Si Aristóteles creía que el hombre es un animal político, lo es, diría Sperber, porque puede argumentar.

El razonamiento es realmente un arma para ganar argumentos y para ser cuidadosos cuando otros intentan convencernos. La verdad no está necesariamente presente en ese ejercicio. Sin embargo, si lo que busacmos es la verdad, ésta no se prueba por sí misma, sino con argumentos. Creemos que Gary Gutting lo describe más claramente:

"The important practical conclusion is that finding the truth does require winning arguments, but not in the sense that my argument defeats yours. Rather, we find an argument that defeats all contrary arguments. Sperber and Mercier in fact approach this philosophical view when they argue that, on their account, reasoning is most problematic when carried out by isolated individuals and is most effective when carried out in social groups."

Más sobre este tema aquí.

Y sobre Hugo Mercier, el otro co-autor de esta teoría, aquí.

Y sobre Gutting aquí.


*Esta entrada la escribí en otro blog en junio de 2011. 

Estrategia de litigio


Llevo un rato trabajando en el caso Comunidades Europeas – Productos derivados de las focas. Voy a ir dejando algunos apuntes y observaciones.
--

Noruega y Canadá permiten la cacería y venta de productos derivados de las focas pero han adoptado regulaciones que incluyen estándares que garantizan que la cacería se lleve a cabo de una manera “humana”. 
La Unión Europea alegó que no existía manera de garantizar una cacería humana de focas, porque debido a las características del polo norte, toda cacería de focas es cruel. Al hacer esto, su estrategia fue la de descartar el uso de estándares de Canadá, Noruega o de donde fuera, inclusive internacionales, para permitir la caza de focas. Con esto la UE logró que la cuestión de la cacería de las focas estuviera girando alrededor, de otro tipo de estándar o reglas que funcionaban como estándares, es decir, alrededor de alguna de las tres excepciones (inuit, GRM o viajeros).

Cuando la Unión Europea logró que el Órgano de Apelación desestimara  los argumentos de Canadá y Noruega respecto al uso de sus estándares para asegurar una cacería humana, la UE obtuvo una gran victoria parcial, pero igual perdió el caso. ¿Entonces, fue una buena estrategia de litigio?  ¿O fue una victoria pírrica? 


Espero volver a esto con una respuesta.

Thursday, 4 June 2015

Gas lacrimógeno, SIDA e internet: las manifestaciones en contra de tratados comerciales



“De vuelta a la Batalla en Seattle pero sin el gas lacrimógeno” (Back to the Battle in Seattle but without the teargas). Es el título del artículo de Alan Beattie en la versión impresa del Financial Times del 16/17 de mayo  de 2015. Sin duda, este fue un título más sexy que el que apareció en la versión online “Las tribus están encerradas en la batalla sobre los acuerdos comerciales” (The tribes are locked in battle over trade deals).

Comentó el tema del título porque ciertamente desde 1999, año en que se llevó a cabo la tercera Conferencia Ministerial de la OMC en Seattle, las manifestaciones anti-OMC han bajado de tono y de intensidad. En la arena pública, la “Batalla en Seattle” probablemente ha sido la prueba más dura para el comercio internacional. Confrontó grupos antiglobalización con la policía local y sin duda el uso del gas pimienta por la policía estigmatizó a la Conferencia Ministerial de Seattle (o la “Ministerial del gas lacrimógeno”, como le llamó algún periodista/manifestante).

En las calles, el resultado fueron duros enfrentamientos, lamentos y denuncias sobre los abusos de la autoridad policial. En los cuartos de negociación, sin embargo, se dice que nada se detuvo e incluso hubo avances en las negociaciones comerciales (G Horlick, «Reactions to Seattle. The Speedbump at Seattle», Journal of International Economic Law 3, n.o 1 (1 de marzo de 2000): 167-173, doi:10.1093/jiel/3.1.178.) En todo caso, el propio Horlick admite que las manifestaciones tuvieron un efecto psicológico en algunos negociadores de ciertos países. Ciertamente, no creo que los Miembros de la OMC hayan cerrado los ojos ante lo sucedido en las calles. Prueba de ello es que no hubo una Declaración Ministerial, como suele hacerse al final de estas reuniones bianuales.

También hay que decir que las manifestaciones, si bien eran en contra de la OMC, en realidad representaban un síntoma del rechazo más general (de los manifestantes) en contra de la globalización. Desde entonces, no ha habido un enfrentamiento de esta magnitud ni con esa resonancia mediática, y la OMC ha dejado de ser el objetivo de los manifestantes y las ONGs, probablemente porque la Ronda de Doha ha dejado de avanzar.

En el 2000, el tema de acceso a medicamentos-SIDA-Sudáfrica sin duda causo un revuelo mediático y legal. Hubo manifestaciones importantes para defender el derecho a la salud. Aquí dejo el tema,  pero solo advierto que no hubo gas lacrimógeno.
  
En 2012, el megáfono de los manifestantes se levantó en contra del A.C.T.A. (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement o Tratado de Comercio contra la Falsificación), un tratado sobre derechos de autor y monitoreo de actividades en internet, negociado en secreto (filtrado por Wikileaks). La campaña pública anti-ACTA utilizó las calles y el internet. Tuvo efecto (acaso porque los potenciales afectados tenían medios de comunicación más efectivos…el internet), y la presión pública obligó a que el ACTA fuera rechazado por los Congresos de algunos de los países negociadores. 


En 2015 como señala Alan Beattie en su artículo, los inconformes han encontrado nuevo ímpetu en contra del TPP y el TTIP. No escribiré aquí y ahora sobre este tema que tiene muchas texturas y merece profundidad. Por lo pronto, mejor será leer el artículo de Beattie.


Así que como vemos, después de Seattle han habido manifestaciones importantes, que han alimentado el debate público de temas que normalmente no salen de los cuartos de los negociadores. Y afortunadamente, en la calle no ha habido más gas lacrimógeno.


Sunday, 17 May 2015

The WTO at 20: Taking Stock and Challenges Ahead



6 de mayo de 2015
Londres, Conferencia sobre los 20 años de la OMC.

La Society of International Economic Law junto con el IEEL de Georgetown y el British Institute of International and Comparative Law organizaron la 15ava Conferencia anual sobre la OMC, titulada esta vez, con motivo del cumpleaños número 20 de la OMC, “The WTO at 20: Taking Stock and Challenges Ahead”. Ante el llamado para presentar documentos de investigación, tuve el honor de ser aceptado para presentar el tema “Defence of multiple policy objectives before WTO Courts: EC-Seals or the false dilemma between protecting Inuits or seals”.

El evento me brindo una oportunidad excepcional para compartir la mesa de discusión con Lorand Bartels, Jan Yves Remy, Andrew Lang y Gracia Marin-Duran. Todos ellos, gente de fina estampa, reconocidos globalmente. En el auditorio se encontraban otros ponentes y p'ublico especializado, gente brillantísima, del calibre de Gabrielle Marceau (co-organizadora del evento).

Ciertamente, un académico joven como yo se siente abrumado por la presencia de tanto personaje celebre. Para ponerlo en términos futboleros, me sentí como en mi primer partido de la Champions League. Ya me había tocado presentar en la OMC en Ginebra, en Brasil y Argentina, pero este día tuvo un sabor especial. Tal vez porque es mi primera presentación desde el accidente que intento' arrancarme la pierna. Así que hoy volví al campo de juego, por lo menos unos minutos, después de mi lesión. ¡Y vamos por los 90 minutos!

Desde antes de mi caída en el volcán traía a las focas y los esquimales en la cabeza. Llevo dos años trabajando de manera intermitente pero muy intensa en el caso. El evento me brindo una oportunidad excepcional para conocer los puntos de vistas de los abogados que representaron a Canadá, Noruega y la Unión Europea, así como de los académicos más brillantes del mundo. Mi investigación será enriquecida con lo acontecido este día. La meta es publicar un paper en los próximos meses.

Además de lo profesional, me llevo a casa varios detalles. La sonrisa de Jan Yves, la amistad de Andrew Lang y la inagotable sabiduría de Gabrielle Marceau. Felicito a los organizadores, y agradezco a Mark Herlihy y Joost Pauwelyn sus atenciones.

Friday, 4 January 2013

Adios al padre del originalismo, Robert Bork

Recien comienza 2013 y ya la muerte de Robert Bork nos ha tomado por sorpresa. El padre del originalismo como metodo, en la interpretacion constitucional americana, se ha ido. Es curioso que este metodo, tan criticado por muchos, sea parecido al enfoque interpretativo utilizado en la adjudicacion de diferendos legales en la OMC. Pero eso es harina de otro costal, como dicen en Mexico. Volviendo a Bork, oh Bork. Un personaje de luces y sombras. Sin duda, sus opiniones politicas comprometidas lo hacen un personaje cuestionable. Defendio a Nixon en el escandalo Watergate. Tssss. ...y es que hay cosas que no se pueden defender. Sin embargo, es innegable que sus ensenanzas han moldeado el derecho de la competencia economica en los Estados Unidos, con su libro The Antitrust Paradox, el cual es constantemente citado en resoluciones de competencia economica en los EEUU. La muerte de Bork solo reaviva sus incisivas opiniones sobre las grietas de la arquitectura institucional que permite a los jueces no rendir cuentas a nadie.